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NOTE
American Lamb Company v. United States:
Application of the Reasonable
Indication Standard
I. INTRODUCTION
The utilization of non-tariff barriers in international trade has taken
on significant importance in protecting United States industries from un-
fair trading practices by foreign competitors.1 Non-tariff barriers such as
antidumping and countervailing duty measures are designed to regulate
"unfair methods of competition and unfair acts"2 by foreign concerns.
Many United States businesses rely on antidumping and countervailing
duty laws to counteract vigorous import competition.3 Although an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws have been enacted to ensure fair
trade and to benefit domestic industries, strict enforcement seldom oc-
curs because of the economic and political implications of invoking these
1 See generally J. CUNNANE & C. STANBROOK, THE LAW AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
IMPOSITION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1983); R. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER (1981); G. WILLIAMSON,
MAJOR U.S. LEGAL REMEDIES AGAINST IMPORT COMPETITION (1980); Comment, Injury Determi-
nations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
33 RUTGERS L.J. 1076 (1981).
2 Section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, states:
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION DECLARED UNLAWFUL-Unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, or in
their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is
to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the
United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when found by the Com-
mission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in
this section. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1987).
3 See Bello, Current Subsidy and Antidumping Issues After the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 21
STAN. J. INT'L LAW 299, 300 (1985).
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laws against the affected foreign traders or governments.4
Antidumping and countervailing duty laws provide the principal
legal remedies for United States corporations to combat adverse effects
from harmful trade practices. "Dumping" describes an international
trade practice in which merchandise is sold in a foreign market for less
than the price in its own domestic market.5 Antidumping regulations are
designed to discourage the importation of goods sold in the United States
at less than fair value6 by imposing a duty equal to the difference between
the foreign market value and the price of the dumped product in the
United States.7 Countervailing duty laws impose a special duty to offset
subsidies received by foreign companies from their respective govern-
ments on products exported to the United States.' A government sub-
sidy is a financial benefit conferred on the production, manufacture, or
distribution of a product or service in its home industry. Since goods
which are subsidized provide a competitive price advantage over unsub-
sidized goods from the importing country,9 countervailing duties are as-
sessed against the imported merchandise in an amount equal to the net
subsidy10 in order to promote fair trade. 1
4 See Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agree-
ments Act (Can) (Will) (Should) Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361
(1979).
5 See J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1966) (Jacob Viner
provides the most widely recognized economic definition of dumping as "price discrimination be-
tween national markets"); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 44-50 (1958); Myerson, A
Review of Current Antidumping Procedures: United States Law and the Case of Japan, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 168-72 (1976); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1980)(aff'd 475 U.S. 574(1984)).
6 Fair market value is defined as "the price at which the product is sold or offered for sale in the
principal markets of the country from which it is exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in
the ordinary course of trade for home consumption. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(a)(1)(A) (1987).
7 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B) (1987).
8 19 U.S.C. § 1671e (1987); see G. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 17; Bello, supra note 3, at 303-
04. Two different statutory provisions regulate the imposition of countervailing duties. First, the so-
called Subsidies Code governs imports from "countries under the Agreement." See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671(b) (1987). The Subsidies Code refers to the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1979. Second,
§ 1303 of the Trade and Tariff Agreement of 1984 encompasses all nations not under the Subsidies
Code. The only major difference between the two statutory provisions is in the injury determination
test. Under the Subsidies Code, the International Trade Commission ("ITC") must find a material
injury before countervailing duties will be assessed, while under Section 1303 proceedings, the mere
evidence of a government subsidy, without resulting injury, will be adequate for an affirmative deter-
mination by the ITC. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1987).
9 Subsidized goods by a foreign government commonly leads to harmful consequences for the
domestic enterprises, and can result in an artificial impairment to international trade. See G. WIL-
LIAMSON, supra note 1, at 17.
10 19 U.S.C. § 1671(e)(a)(1) (1987).
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The procedure for initiating antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations is contained in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930,12 as
substantially amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,13 and sub-
sequently changed by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.14 In addition,
the regulations promulgated by the International Trade Administration
("ITA") of the Department of Commerce 15 and the International Trade
Commission ("ITC"), 16 contain the appropriate measures followed by
these agencies in their investigations of potential dumping and counter-
vailing duty violations.17 If the ITA determines that an investigation is
warranted after considering information reasonably available to it, then
the ITC renders a preliminary injury determination."i This preliminary
determination is based on the best information available as to whether a
"reasonable indication" exists that an United States industry has been
materially injured, threatened with material injury, or materially re-
tarded from imports that have been allegedly sold at less than fair value
or subsidized.19
The administration of the reasonable indication standard by the ITC
has conflicted with the interpretation of the United States Court of Inter-
11 Two findings are required before antidumping and countervailing duties will be assessed. The
International Trade Administration ("ITA") must first determine that products were sold in the
United States at less than fair value or were subsidized. If a positive determination is rendered, then
the ITC must determine if an industry in the United States is materially injured, or is threatened
with material injury, or that an establishment of a United States industry is materially retarded as a
result from the "dumped" or subsidized imports. However, if the ITC determines that a reasonable
indication of injury does not exist, then the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations
cease. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1987); Bello, supra note 3, at 301-04.
12 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77g (1987).
13 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections
of 19 U.S.C.).
14 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984)(codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
15 19 C.F.R. §§ 353-55 (1987).
16 19 C.F.R. §§ 200-13 (1987).
17 See supra note 11.
18 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1673b (1987).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1987) states in relevant part:
(a) Determination by Commission of reasonable indication of injury
Except in the case of a petition dismissed by the administering authority under section
167la(c)(3) of this title, the Commission, within 45 days after the date on which a petition is
filed under section 1671a(b) of this title or on which it receives notice from the administering
authority of an investigation commenced under section 1671a(a) of this title, shall make a deter-
mination, of whether there is a reasonable indication that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation by the adminis-
tering authority. If that determination is negative, the investigation shall be terminated.
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national Trade.2' In past cases, the Court of International Trade has
interpreted the reasonable indication standard as a low threshold inquiry
in which "only the barest clues or signs" were necessary to justify an
affirmative preliminary injury determination.21 As a result, the Court of
International Trade ruled conflicting evidence could not be weighed
when making a preliminary determination on material injury to an
United States industry resulting from imported products.2 2 However, in
American Lamb Company v. United States,2 3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the Court of International
Trade's interpretation of the reasonable indication standard. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the ITC's practice of exam-
ining conflicting evidence to ascertain the presence or absence of a rea-
sonable indication of injury or threat of injury in its preliminary
determination "accords with clearly discernible legislative intent and is
sufficiently reasonable."'2
This Note will discuss the importance of the reasonable indication
standard as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in American Lamb. The Note first examines previous decisions by the
Court of International Trade which prohibited the use of conflicting evi-
dence in preliminary injury determinations. Second, it will analyze the
procedural history of the American Lamb case and the rationale for its
decision in light of the previous rulings by the Court of International
Trade. The Note will conclude with reasons for supporting the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the reasonable indica-
tion standard.
II. PROCEDURES FOR ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
INVESTIGATIONS
Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations may be com-
20 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the United States Court
of International Trade to review decisions by the ITA and the ITC. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1987).
Adverse decisions by the Court of International Trade can be appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1987). A party can obtain judicial review for practi-
cally any decision rendered in antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings. See Horlick, supra
note 26, at 835. For example, initiation of an investigation, negative preliminary determinations,
final determinations, and even decisions not to proceed further can be questioned in the Court of
International Trade. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1987). The Court of International Trade has heard count-
less number of cases concerning antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, and its caseload
continues to increase.
21 See Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 646 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
22 See id.; Jeannette Sheet Glass Co. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983);
American Lamb Co. v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 979 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
23 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
24 Id. at 1004.
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menced either by self-initiation on the part of the ITA or by the filing of
a petition by a private, "interested party"25 on behalf of a domestic in-
dustry.26 Pursuant to the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, petitions must be
filed simultaneously with the ITA and ITC. Within twenty days of re-
ceipt of the petition, the ITA must decide: 1) whether the petition alleges
the necessary elements for proper relief and "contains information rea-
sonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations." 2) If the
determination is affirmative, the ITA will then initiate an investigation
into whether the merchandise in question is being, or is likely to be sold
at less than fair value, or is being subsidized. 3) If the determination is
negative, then the ITA must terminate further proceedings.27 If the peti-
tion provides a prima facie case to initiate an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty proceeding, then the ITC will be notified immediately.28
A critical aspect of antidumping and countervailing duty proceed-
ings is the collection of information by the ITA. The process of gather-
ing data is implemented by sending questionnaires to the relevant
importers, manufacturers, or foreign governments.29 This process is the
first step of the formal investigative procedure. The questionnaire usu-
ally will request information pertaining to activities which occurred dur-
ing the six month period directly preceding the prospective investigation.
Once the questionnaires are received, the respondent has thirty days in
which to answer. This thirty-day period can be extended if the respon-
dent produces evidence of its cooperation, as well as reasons for request-
ing an extension. The answers to the questionnaires must be
meticulously presented, since the completed questionnaires are included
in the record of the proceeding. 0 After receipt of the answers, the ITA
then must verify the responses by analyzing the thoroughness and com-
pleteness of the questionnaires.31
The ITC must render a preliminary determination within forty-five
days after the filing of an antidumping or countervailing duty petition.
This preliminary determination is based on the best information available
25 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1987).
26 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a (1987). Although the ITA can self-initiate an antidumping or
countervailing duty investigation, practically all proceedings have been initiated through petitions
from interested parties. See Horlick, Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws, 58 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 828 (1984).
27 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c), 1673a(c) (1987).
28 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(d), 1673a(d) (1987). See also United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563,
1568-70 (Fed. Cir. 1983); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 449.
29 19 C.F.R. § 207.8 (1987).
30 19 C.F.R. § 207.2(i)(1) (1987).
31 19 C.F.R. § 207.4(b) (1987).
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as to whether a reasonable indication exists that an industry in the
United States has been materially injured, threatened with material in-
jury, or materially retarded by dumped or subsidized imports.32 This
analysis involves surveying the health of the United States industry as
well as the impact of imported merchandise on the affected enterprise.
All parties have the opportunity to present written statements before a
preliminary or final injury determination will be rendered by the ITC. If
the ITC's preliminary determination indicates that injury is not likely to
occur, then the investigations will terminate. The ITC will enter a final
determination on the injury issue only if the ITA also finds that less than
fair value sales or subsidization have resulted from the alleged imported
merchandise.33
The ITA must determine within 160 days of a self-initiated investi-
gation or petition, filed properly by a private domestic interested party,
whether a reasonable basis exists to believe or suspect that the alleged
dumped products were sold at less than fair value.34 In countervailing
duty cases, preliminary determinations must be rendered within 85 days,
but can be extended in certain situations for an additional 65 days if the
case is complex, novel, or the number of businesses to be investigated is
large.35 These preliminary determinations are based on the "best infor-
mation" available to the ITA at the time of its decision.36 The 160-day
period rule for antidumping cases either can be shortened or extended
depending on the circumstances. For instance, in most cases the interests
of the parties, such as the foreign exporters and the domestic industry,
would be enhanced if the preliminary investigation process were rapidly
facilitated. As a result, if the ITA obtained sufficient information and the
petitioner waived verification, a preliminary determination can be exe-
cuted within 75 days after the commencement of the investigation.37 On
the other hand, the time period can be extended up to an additional 210
days under extraordinary or necessary situations.38
The final determination by the ITA on the issue of whether an im-
ported product was sold at less than fair value or subsidized must be
ascertained within seventy-five days of the preliminary investigation.39
This limitation can be extended to 135 days if requested by the party
32 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1673b (1987).
33 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1673b (1987).
34 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1987).
35 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b) (1987).
36 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(b), 1673b(b) (1987).
37 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(2) (1987).
38 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(c) (1987).
39 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(a)(1), 1673d(a)(1) (1987).
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adversely affected by the preliminary determination.4 If the ITA's final
determination were negative, it would inform the ITC accordingly, and
any further proceedings would be terminated.41 However, if the final de-
termination were affirmative, then the ItA must await the ITC's final
material injury decision.42
If the ITC begins its final investigation, the injury decision must be
reached between 45 and 75 days after a final affirmative decision from the
ITA.43 This short period of time adds pressure to the ITC because the
process of rendering a final determination encompasses evaluation of
briefs, pre-hearings, hearings, and testimony from economic and techni-
cal experts.4 The ITC's decision is based on a majority vote by the
Commissioners. If the vote is divided evenly as to whether the injury
decision should be negative or affirmative, then this would be considered
as if an affirmative decision had been rendered. An affirmative determi-
nation on any of three issues-i) material injury to an United States in-
dustry, 2) threat of material injury to an United States industry,
3) material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry-will
result in a final affirmative determination.45 Upon finding an injury to an
United States industry, the ITC will notify the ITA and all interested
parties involved, as well as publish its findings in the Federal Register,
while the ITA will publish an Antidumping Duty Order.'
The ITA must publish an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Or-
der within seven days of the ITC's affirmative conclusion of injury. A
typical Order will describe the dumped or subsidized merchandise, and
will instruct the Customs Service pending liquidation, to demand the de-
posit of antidumping or countervailing duties, equal to the dumping or
subsidized margin.4 7 Subsequently, the Customs Service will impose an-
tidumping or countervailing duties as determined by the ITA.48 The Or-
der must be restricted to include only those products which were found
to have caused injury, and cannot be extended to items found merely to
have been sold at less than fair value or subsidized.49
The Order would remain in effect and any subsequent entries of the
particular merchandise would be subject to dumping or countervailing
40 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(2) (187).
41 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d(c)(2) (1987).
42 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1987).
43 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(2)-(3), 1673d(b)(2)-(3) (1987).
44 Horlick, supra note 26, at 834.
45 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d (1987).
46 19 u.s.c. § 1671d(d), 1673d(d) (1987).
47 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e, 1673e (1987).
48 19 U.S.C. § 1673e (1987).
49 See Badger-Powhatean v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653 (CL Int'l Trade 1985).
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duties until the foreign manufacturer complied with the Order.50 The
ITA will review its determinations once a year to decide whether the
dumping or subsidizing practices have ceased.51
The ITA has the discretion to suspend an investigation prior to its
final determination. This will occur "upon the acceptance of an agree-
ment to revise pieces from exporters of the merchandise which is the
subject of the investigation who account for substantially all of the im-
port of that merchandise into the United States."52 The foreign manu-
facturer must agree to cease exports of the products for a six month
period after the date from which the investigation is suspended, or until
their prices are adjusted to completely eliminate the dumping or counter-
vailing margin.53
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE REASONABLE INDICATION OF INJURY
STANDARD BY THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
United States antidumping and countervailing duty laws seek to
safeguard domestic industries, while preserving an environment condu-
cive for international trade.54 Congress realizes that non-tariff barriers,
while negating adverse affects of unfair trade practices, can be detrimen-
tal to United States trading policies.55 Consequently, an effort has been
made to ensure that the procedures in antidumping and countervailing
actions accord parties a fair opportunity to be heard, to challenge and
question, present evidence and witnesses, and to appeal adverse decisions
through the judicial process.56 Although advocates of protectionist trade
policies favor vigorous and stringent -enforcement of antidumping and
countervailing duty procedures, rationally and fairly enforced rules will
not only protect domestic businesses but will preserve credibility with
United States trading partners.
In the recent decision of American Lamb Company v. United States,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit interpreted the reasonable
indication standard as authorizing the ITC to consider conflicting evi-
dence at the preliminary investigation stage.57 Accordingly, the ITC can
now engage in an expedited and meaningful injury investigation process.
50 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1987); 19 C.F.R. § 353.53 (1987).
51 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1987).
52 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(c)(1) (1987). See 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(1) (1987).
53 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(b), 1673c(b) (1987).
54 See Note, The Republic Steel Decision: The Proper Scope of ITC Preliminary Determinations
Under Countervailing Duty Law, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 451, 458-59 (1985).
55 See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
56 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1987).
57 785 F.2d at 1001-02.
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Furthermore, this decision has meant that preliminary injury determina-
tions will serve a significant purpose in antidumpingand countervailing
duty proceedings and will eliminate unmeritorious claims before they
enter the final investigation stage. As a result, not only will future inves-
tigations become more equitable for foreign manufacturers alleged to
have sold their products at less than fair value or received a subsidy, but
they will comport with past practices of the ITC and the intent of
Congress.
However, prior to the Court of Appeal's decision, the Court of In-
ternational Trade interpreted the reasonable indication standard differ-
ently than the ITC.5 8 This difference is demonstrated by three important
decisions: Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 9 Jeannette Sheet Glass
Corp. v. United States,' and American Lamb Company v. United
States.61 In these cases, the ITC found no reasonable indication of in-
jury, which led all three petitioners to appeal that determination to the
Court of International Trade. In all three cases, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade held that the purpose of the preliminary investigation was to
discern whether a possibility of injury could arise from the evidence in
the given situation.62 Weighing conflicting evidence was not to occur
during preliminary injury investigations, but rather reserved for final de-
termination proceedings. Consequently, the Court of International
Trade declared that the ITC had imposed an unlawfully stringent reason-
able indication standard that closely resembled requirements necessary
for final determinations.63
The Court of International Trade's first extensive interpretation of
the reasonable indication standard arose in the Republic Steel case." In
Republic Steel, several United States steel companies requested a review
of negative preliminary determinations by the ITC in countervailing duty
proceedings involving steel products from Brazil, Spain and South Ko-
rea.6 The ITC found no reasonable indication of injury or threat of in-
58 See also American Grape Growers Alliance v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 603, 607 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985)(at the preliminary injury determination stage, the investigation must go forward if the
petitioner raised the possibility of injury); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, 614 F. Supp.
1252, 1253 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)(ITC lawfully looked for the reality of injury, not the possibility of
injury).
59 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
60 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
61 611 F. Supp. 979 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985); see infra notes 89-150 and accompanying text.
62 See 591 F. Supp. at 650; 607 F. Supp. at 133; 611 F. Supp. at 981.
63 Id.
64 591 F. Supp. at 640. See also Bello & Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series 8: Recent
Developments Regarding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Injury Determinations, 20 INT'L
LAw. 689, 695-96 (Spring 1986).
65 591 F. Supp. at 642.
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jury from the imported products. As a result, the ITC concluded in its
preliminary determination that the alleged subsidized products did not
materially injure or threaten to injure an United States industry.66
In Republic Steel, the Court of International Trade held that the
statutory language and legislative history indicated a low threshold for
finding a reasonable indication of injury during the preliminary determi-
nation proceeding.67 , The court concluded that the ITC should not con-
sider conflicting evidence since, "[t]he object of these determinations
should have been simply to find whether there were any facts which
raised the possibility of injury. The resolution or interpretation of con-
flicting facts should have been reserved for a possible final injury determi-
nation. ' 68 The court stressed that the interpretation enunciated by the
ITC on the reasonable indication standard should actually be the proper
standard for final determinations.69 Consequently, based on the mere
possibility that imports were harming United States industries, foreign
manufacturers will have to defend their cases to the final
determination.7"
The decision of the Court of International Trade to preclude the
ITC from using conflicting evidence was based on several different fac-
tors.71 First, the court found that the threshold for finding a reasonable
indication of injury was extremely low since the purpose of the prelimi-
nary investigation was only to decide whether a full scale investigation
should take place.72 The court reasoned that "[t]he word 'indication'
suggests only the barest clues or signs needed to justify further inquiry.
The use of the 'reasonable' standard suggests that, in the case of a multi-
plicity of allegedly injurious importations, it is too much to expect firm
66 See Id.; Carbon Steel Structural Shapes from Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-118 (preliminary deter-
mination), USITC Pub. No. 1221 (February, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 9100 (1982); Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Bar from Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-126 (preliminary determination), USITC Pub. No. 1221
(February, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 9104 (1982); Cold-Formed Carbon Steel Bar from Brazil, Inv. No.
701-TA-135 (preliminary determination), USITC Pub. No. 1221 (February, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg.
9110 (1982); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet from Spain, Inv. No. 701-TA-156 (preliminary determi-
nation), USITC Pub. No. 1255 (June, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 26,040 (1982); Hot-Roiled Alloy Steel Bar
from Spain, Inv. No. 701-TA-161 (preliminary determination), USITC Pub. No. 1255 (June, 1982),
47 Fed. Reg. 26,043 (1982); Cold-Formed Alloy Steel Bar from Spain, Inv. No. 701-TA-163 (prelim-
inary determination), USITC Pub. No. 1255 (June, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 26,045 (1982); Cold-Rolled
Carbon Steel Sheet from Korea, Inv. No. 701-TA-172 (preliminary determination), USITC Pub. No.
1261 (June, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 28,481 (1982).
67 See 591 F. Supp. at 646-47.
68 Id. at 650.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 648.
71 See Note, supra note 54, at 470-75.
72 591 F. Supp. at 646.
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proof with respect to all."'73
Second, the importance of legislative history was employed to sup-
port the court's low threshold rationale. The court relied on an interpre-
tation of the reasonable indication standard by the Ways and Means
House Committee, which stated "that a reasonable indication will exist
in each case in which the facts reasonably indicate that an industry in the
United States could possibly be suffering material injury .... ,,74 In addi-
tion, the court emphasized the importance of the legislative history
which indicated that the ITC's decision was "primarily part of the deci-
sion as to whether an investigation should be initiated. It [was] not in-
tended to have the substantive content of the full investigation itself."'75
Although the court conceded that Congress expected a thorough prelimi-
nary determination inquiry, it concluded that the ITC could not conduct
an exhaustive investigation within the 45-day statutory limit.7 6 At this
stage, "the thoroughness is for the purpose of deciding whether a possi-
bility of injury exists, not for the purpose of deciding between alternative
possibilities."77
Finally, the court noted the significance that in antidumping and
countervailing procedures, the ITC's preliminary determination came
before the ITA's preliminary investigation. The Senate had declared that
the ITC's preliminary determination function was "not stringent" and
"intended to be lower than the Treasury's standard for preliminary de-
terminations under current practice."'"8 Through this interpretation, the
court reasoned that the preliminary determination of the ITC was in-
tended only to delete wholly undeserving petitions.
Since the ITC had weighed conflicting evidence in its preliminary
determination, the Court of International Trade ruled that the ITC's de-
cision was not in accordance with the law.79 In addition, the court noted
that
[i]f the petition does not contain the evidence of injury which could reason-
ably be expected to be within petitioner's knowledge, or is false, or is in
conflict on essential points with matters of public record, or does not state
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 52 (1979)).
75 Id. at 647 (emphasis in original).
76 Id. at 648.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 647-48 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 50, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 436 (1979)). Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the adminis-
tering body of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings was changed from the Treasury
Department to the ITA. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1987); Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed.Reg.
69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
79 591 F. Supp. at 651.
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injury as a matter of law even if its contents are taken as true, then the ITC
may properly conclude that there is no reasonable indication of injury and
no need for further investigation. 80
Consequently, the court remanded the case and required the ITC to
render a preliminary determination on the issue of whether a reasonable
indication of injury existed to the hot-rolled alloy steel bars industry and
to the cold-formed alloy steel bars industry, without considering conflict-
ing evidence.8"
In Jeannette Sheet Glass, a domestic producer of thin sheet glass
challenged the ITC's negative preliminary injury determination. The
ITC found there was no reasonable indication that the Jeannette Sheet
Glass Corporation, the sole manufacturer of thin sheet glass in the
United States, would be injured or was threatened with material injury
from imports of such glass from Switzerland, Belgium, and the Federal
Republic of Germany.82 Jeannette Sheet Glass Corporation sought re-
view of the ITC's determination in the Court of International Trade and
applied the low threshold of inquiry holding in Republic Steel to support
its allegations. Consequently, the Court of International Trade was faced
again with the issue of whether the ITC had misapplied the reasonable
indication standard by weighing conflicting evidence of record.
The ITC's position was that it could weigh evidence during the pre-
liminary injury procedure and could render a negative determination if
clear and convincing evidence existed that imports were not possibly ma-
terially injuring or threatening material injury to the domestic industry.3
The ITC continued to maintain that it was properly applying the reason-
able indication standard. However, the ITC conceded that its applica-
tion of the reasonable indication standard was unlawful as compared to
the standard enunciated in Republic Steel. 4
The Court of International Trade reaffirmed its earlier decision in
Republic Steel by holding that the ITC should not have examined con-
flicting evidence to reach the reasonable indication standard at the pre-
liminary stage of its investigation. 5 The court held that the ITC had
erroneously acted by resolving the injury issue by weighing conflicting
80 785 F.2d at 999-1000 (quoting 16 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 14, at 56).
81 591 F.Supp. at 651. The ITC did not appeal the Court of International Trade's decision since
the case was resolved after a voluntary restraint agreement was reached between all relevant parties.
Bello & Holmer, supra note 64, at 696.
82 607 F. Supp. at 127. See Thin Sheet Glass from Switzerland, Belguim, and the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-127, 128 and 129 (preliminary determination), USITC Pub.
No. 1376, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,213 (1983).
83 607 F. Supp. at 129.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 133.
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evidence, rather than only determining whether sufficient information in
the record existed to raise the potentiality of injury.86 The court stated
the "[ITC]'s 'preliminary' determination, in effect, constituted a final de-
termination predicated solely upon data submitted in the forty-five day
period permitted at the preliminary stage.",87 This case was then re-
manded to the ITC for reconsideration of its negative preliminary injury
determination without taking into account conflicting evidence. 88 There-
fore, according to the Court of International Trade, the appropriate stan-
dard for preliminary determinations by the ITC was articulated and set
forth in the opinion in Republic Steel.
IV. THE AMERICAN LAMB DECISION
A. Factual Background
On April 18, 1984, American Lamb Company,89 Denver Lamb
Company and Iowa Lamb Company filed petitions with the ITA and the
ITC alleging that lamb meat imported from New Zealand was being sub-
sidized and sold at less than fair value in the United States. 90 These
plaintiffs supplied evidence of declining prices for lamb, diminishing pro-
duction of live lambs, and the rising number of lamb and sheep slaughter
to indicate the liquidation of herds.91 Thereby, plaintiffs alleged that
lamb imported from New Zealand suppressed prices in the United States.
Pursuant to United States antidumping and countervailing duty laws,
92
the ITC initiated investigations93 to determine if a reasonable indication
of material injury, or threat of material injury, or material retardation to
86 Id. at 129.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 133. On remand, the ITC in accordance with the Republic Steel case, did not weigh
conflicting evidence and as a consequence, rendered an affirmative preliminary injury determination.
See Thin Sheet Glass from Switzerland, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, USITC
Pub. No. 1727 (July 1985).
89 American Lamb Company, located in Chino, California, is a cooperative that packs, processes
and sells lamb meat, principally from lambs produced by its constituent members who are sheep
ranchers.
90 785 F.2d at 996. The petitions were filed on behalf of sheep ranchers, feed lot operators, and
lamb meat packing and processing companies.
91 611 F. Supp. at 980.
92 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1673b (1987).
93 New Zealand is not a "country under the Agreement," and is therefore not entitled to an
injury determination in countervailing duty proceedings. 611 F. Supp. at 980. The United States
had withdrawn recognition of New Zealand as a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade Subsidies Code because New Zealand had failed to remove its main subsidies. Id. As a result,
issues relating to the ITC's countervailing duty determination were moot. Plaintiffs, therefore, fied
a new countervailing duty petition on March 26, 1985; see id.; see also Lamb Meat from New Zea-
land: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,949 (1985).
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the establishment of an United States industry existed.94
During the preliminary investigation, the ITC accepted evidence
from the United States Department of Agriculture, lamb meat packers
and producers, academic and trade association researchers, and inter-
ested parties from New Zealand.95 Notification that the ITC would be
initiating its investigation was given on April 25, 1984.96 In addition, a
public conference was held by the ITC to hear evidence pertaining to
New Zealand lamb meat from all parties that requested a presence at the
conference.
97
In its preliminary determination on May 25, 1984, the ITC decided
by a 4-2 vote that no reasonable indication arose that imported lamb
meat from New Zealand was materially injuring, threatening material
injury, or was materially retarding the establishment of the United States
lamb industry.98 The plaintiffs disputed the ITC's use of conflicting evi-
dence in its determination of the reasonable indication standard, and sub-
sequently appealed the ITC's decision to the Court of International
Trade.99 They asserted that the ITC's decision should have been re-
manded in light of previous decisions by the Court of International
Trade, which held that the ITC could not weigh conflicting evidence in
arriving at a preliminary determination."° The ITC, on the other hand,
contended that under 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a), it was authorized to weigh
conflicting evidence in preliminary injury investigations, but conceded
that if the previous decisions were upheld, then plaintiffs' motion for re-
mand would be appropriate.10' This case was another attempt by the
ITC to have the Court of International Trade reverse its earlier decisions
prohibiting the ITC from considering conflicting evidence during the pre-
liminary injury determination stage.
Judge DiCarlo, as judge in the American Lamb case, stated that
"stare decisis counsels the Court to follow the prior decisions."' 02 Con-
sequently, the action was remanded to the ITC for re-evaluation of the
case in conformity with the previous standard of review enunciated in
Republic Steel and Jeannette Sheet Glass. Despite the reaffirmation of
94 611 F. Supp. at 980; 785 F.2d at 996.
95 785 F.2d at 996. The New Zealand intervenors included the New Zealand Meat Producers
Board, the Meat Export Development Company, and the New Zealand Lamb Company.
96 49 Fed. Reg. 17,828 (1984); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 24,458 (1984).
97 785 F.2d at 996.
98 Lamb Meat from New Zealand, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-214, and 731-TA-188, USITC Pub. No.
1534; see also 49 Fed. Reg. 24,458 (1984).
99 785 F.2d 997; see also 611 F. Supp. at 979-81.
10 See 591 F. Supp. at 640; 607 F. Supp. at 123.
101 785 F.2d at 997.
102 Id.
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the reasonable indication standard in these three cases within one year,
the ITC appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in an
effort to reverse the Republic Steel and Jeannette Sheet Glass cases.
B. The Decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The Court of International Trade, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(d)(1), allows the ITC to appeal its decisions to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. On October 15, 1985, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit granted the ITC's petition for an interlocutory
appeal. 103 Thereafter, on February 28, 1986, in one of the most impor-
tant court decisions concerning the injury issue for preliminary determi-
nations in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, the Court
of Appeals effectively overruled the decision in Republic Steel and its
progeny."°  Consequently, the ITC's interpretation of the reasonable in-
dication standard was upheld.
The decision by the appellate court to allow the ITC to weigh con-
flicting evidence in its preliminary injury determination was predicated
on several reasons. 105 First, the essential aspect in the Court of Appeals'
decision was the deference and great weight accorded to the ITC in ad-
ministering and interpreting its own statute.1 0 6 In granting substantial
deference to the ITC's interpretation of the reasonable indication stan-
dard, the Court stated: "though a court may reject an agency interpreta-
tion that contravenes clearly discernible legislative intent, its role when
that intent is not contravened is to determine whether the agency's inter-
pretation is 'sufficiently reasonable." 10v The ITC had consistently articu-
lated the reasonable indication standard as one mandating that it issue a
negative determination only if. 1) the entire record contains clear and
convincing evidence that no material injury or threat of material injury
occurred, and 2) no contrary evidence would likely arise in a final pro-
ceeding. 10 8 The court determined that this practice applied by the ITC
provided "fully adequate protection against unwarranted termina-
tions."109 In addition, the above guidelines were said to be evenly dis-
tributed for possibilities of affirmative or negative determinations.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the ITC's "long-standing
103 785 F.2d at 997.
104 Id. at 1004.
105 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 64, at 698.
106 Id. at 1001; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1978).
107 Id at 1001; see also Fed. Election Comm. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27 (1981).
108 Id. at 1001.
109 Id.
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practice must be viewed as permissible within the statutory frame-
work."11 "One writing on a clean slate might find the [Court of Interna-
tional Trade's] reasoning fully acceptable, but a 'court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation.' """
Second, the Court rejected the Court of International Trade's inter-
pretation which equated the statutory phrase "reasonable indication"
with "mere possibility.""' 2 The Court of Appeals, in relying on the plain
meaning of the statute,' 1 3 stated that the standard did not intend a rea-
sonable indication for the need of more inquiry, but only called for a
reasonable indication of injury." 4 The Court applied the reasoning in
United States v. Roses, Inc., 5 where the Court of Appeals had construed
Congress' intent to allow the ITC to evaluate all relevant information in
order to avoid unwarranted investigations." 6 Enabling every investiga-
tion to reach the final determination stage on the mere possibility of in-
jury would mean that virtually every petition could go beyond the
preliminary investigation stage, since some possibility of injury could be
shown. 117
Third, Congressional intent firmly justified that conflicting evidence
be weighed, since sections 1671b(a) and 1673b(a) of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979 specifically stated that a preliminary determination
must be made from the "best information" available."' In Budd Com-
pany Railway Division v. United States,' the Court of International
Trade declared that "best information available" meant accessible or ob-
tainable from whatever sources, 120 which would not be limited to the
petitioner, but would include information supplied by any interested
party to the proceedings.' Therefore, if conflicting evidence were
available at the time of the preliminary determination, then this would be
included as part of the best information in applying the reasonable indi-
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1001 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984)).
112 Id. at 1001-02.
113 It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that "[the] starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 197 (1976)(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)).
114 785 F.2d at 1001.
115 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
116 Id. at 1569-71.
117 785 F.2d at 1002.
118 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1673b (1987). See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a (1987).
119 507 F. Supp. 997 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
120 Id. at 1000.
121 Id. at 1003-04.
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cation standard. "It is ... intended that the ITC will investigate the
allegations in the petition in as thorough a manner as possible using the
information available within that time period, and will provide interested
parties a reasonable opportunity to present their views." 122 By requiring
a thorough investigation, "Congress intended the application of agency
expertise, not only to examine the petition and supporting data for inter-
nal inconsistencies, but also to evaluate it in light of a wide body of other
information, to the end that, so far as possible, the commencement of
unwarranted investigations should be avoided." 123 Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that if the ITC were forced to disregard all
evidence which tended not to support an antidumping or countervailing
duty petition, then respondents or other petitioners would have no rea-
son or incentive to submit any evidence to the ITC during preliminary
determinations.
Finally, the Court of Appeals discussed judicial reviewability of the
ITC's preliminary decisions. The Court stated that finding it more diffi-
cult to reverse a negative preliminary determination merely because the
ITC weighed conflicting evidence should not be a basis for prohibiting
the ITC from interpreting its method of implementing the reasonable in-
dication standard.124 However, the Court declared that since any nega-
tive preliminary determination could be reviewed by a court, the ITC's
decision could not be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 125 If a negative injury determina-
tion did not violate these standards, then the court cautioned against
overturning ITC's decisions. Congress "has entrusted the decision-mak-
ing authority in a specialized, complex economic situation to [ITC] ....
Thus, review.., would be to ascertain whether there was a rational basis
in fact for the determination .... 126
V. AMERICAN LAMB AND THE REASONABLE INDICATION STANDARD
The decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
American Lamb is widely considered the most significant case pertaining
to preliminary injury determinations in antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations. As a direct result of this decision, the ITC is more
capable of rendering negative preliminary findings. Furthermore, the
122 H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1979).
123 785 F.2d at 1002 (quoting United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d at 1569)(emphasis in
original).
124 Id. at 1004.
125 Id; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(a) (1987).
126 785 F.2d at 1004 (quoting S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 252, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 638).
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American Lamb decision has conferred great weight to the ITC's inter-
pretation of the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes that it
administers.
The ITC should be granted great weight in both the interpretation
of its statutory mandate and the methods it decides to employ in ad-
ministering antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 127 The courts
have recognized that interpretations of statutes that an agency is charged
with administering are entitled to substantial deference.12 The agency's
interpretation will be "sustained unless unreasonable and plainly incon-
sistent with the statute, and [is] to be held valid unless weighty reasons
require otherwise." 129 Furthermore, the "court need not conclude that
the agency construction [is] the only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would
have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding."13
In reviewing ITC preliminary determinations, Congress has deter-
mined that courts should overturn the agency's decision if it was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law." '131 This high standard of review indicates that Congress
intended to accord the ITC great deference in preliminary injury deter-
minations. Accordingly, Congress wanted the ITC decisions terminating
unmeritorious claims to be reviewed only under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. Even if the ITC should have rendered an affirmative pre-
liminary determination, a court could not overturn the ITC decision
unless the finding was arbitrary or capricious. 132 Thus, Congress in-
tended that the ITC's preliminary hearing would entail more than a find-
ing of a mere possibility of injury. However, the Court of International
Trade held that the ITC's responsibility in a preliminary determination
proceeding was simply to find whether any facts reasonably raise a mere
127 See Luciano Pisoni Fabrica Accessori Instrumenti Musicali v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 255
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)(decision by the Department of Commerce to initiate an investigation was a
sufficiently reasonable interpretation of the statute); Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Chemical Products Corp. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 178 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986). See generally 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.16 (1978).
128 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965).
129 Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924, 928 (1984).
130 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 11
(1984); see Consumer Products Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039
(1985).
131 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1987). For final determinations, the proper standard of review is
based on whether the decision can be supported by substantial evidence, or was not in accordance
with law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b)(1)(B) (1987).
132 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1987).
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possibility of injury. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' overruling of
the Court of International Trade's decisions was consistent with Con-
gressional intent.
Deference can be is heightened further when an agency has inter-
preted its statute consistently over a long period of time and the legisla-
ture has acquiesced in that interpretation.133 According to the Senate
Finance Committee Report, "the 'reasonable indication' standard [is] to
be applied in essentially the same manner as the 'reasonable indication'
standard under section 201(c)(2) of the Antidumping Act [of 1921]. " 134
Historically, under the Antidumping Act of 1921, the ITC has consid-
ered conflicting evidence in applying the reasonable indication standard
to its preliminary injury determinations.135 For example, although the
ITC found that fish imported to the United States from Canada increased
by 42 million pounds over two years, it concluded that no injury resulted
since the increase was likely to distress other exporters rather than harm
United States fisheries.13 6 Also, in Coke from West Germany,137 the ITC
rendered a negative preliminary determination since no reasonable indi-
cation was found that domestic coke producers were injured or were
threatened with injury by coke imports from West Germany. This deter-
uination was made even though evidence existed that underselling by
foreign importers had occurred.13 Clearly, then, the ITC has in the past
weighed all the evidence bearing on the issue of injury. Therefore, the
ITC's use of conflicting evidence in rendering a negative preliminary de-
cision was in conformity with its past practices.
The experience of the ITC in implementing antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws is an additional reason for granting substantial defer-
ence to the agency. As the Supreme Court explained in a leading case:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [adminis-
trative agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of
such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
133 See United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 556 (1982); Smith-Corona Group v. United States,
713 F.2d 1568 (1983).
134 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 66, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 452.
135 See Uncoated Free Sheet Offset Paper from Canada, USITC Pub. No. 869 (1978).
136 See Certain Fish from Canada, USITC Pub. No. 919 (1978).
137 See 44 Fed. Reg. 67,544 (1979).
138 See id. at 67, 545-46; Note, supra note 54, at 460.
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power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 13 9
Although an agency cannot contravene or ignore the intent of the legisla-
ture or the guiding purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative
process.''  The deference granted or extended to the agency's interpre-
tation of its statutory mandate also applies to the methodology that the
agency utilizes in fulfilling its lawfully delegated duties. In order for the
ITC to effectively administer antidumping and countervailing duty laws,
it is essential to allow methodological flexibility. As long as the agency's
methodology and procedures are reasonable means of implementing its
statutory purpose, the courts should not impose their own views as to the
sufficiency of the agency's investigation, or question the agency's meth-
odology. Granting due deference to the expertise of the ITC will allow
the administering agency to competently implement antidumping and
countervailing duty laws and serve to promote the uniform application of
its statutes.14 1
Although a low threshold of inquiry may exist in terms of assessing
the adequacy of antidumping or countervailing duty petitions, legislative
history supports the view that the reasonable indication standard was
meant to be an extremely flexible concept.142 If the ITC could not weigh
conflicting evidence in its preliminary determination, then there would be
no reason to separate a preliminary and final investigation process. An
antidumping or countervailing duty investigation should not be allowed
to proceed merely because a petitioner simply raises the issue of injury.
In other words, without the ability to consider conflicting evidence, the
ITC could not eliminate petitions which clearly lack substantive merit,
since practically all petitions would evidence some possibility of injury.
Thus, by prohibiting the use of conflicting evidence, the ITC's enforce-
ment procedure clearly would be undermined.
Congress' mandate that the ITC must attempt every effort to con-
duct a thorough inquiry based on the best information available further
supports the argument that the ITC should be allowed to consider con-
flicting evidence in order to engage in an intensive preliminary injury
determination. 43 Under antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the
ITC is directed to determine, based on the best information available at
139 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
140 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
48 (1983)(quoting New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (dissenting opinion)).
141 See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
142 See 591 F. Supp. at 646.
143 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEWS 381, 435.
210
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the time of its decision, whether a reasonable indication exists that
dumped or subsidized products caused injury, threatened material injury,
or materially retarded the establishment of an United States industry. In
rendering a preliminary injury determination, the ITC must "make every
effort to conduct a thorough inquiry,"144 which encompasses the obliga-
tion to permit all interested parties an opportunity to present evidence on
their behalf. 45 The thoroughness requirement not only rebuts the "mere
possibility" standard enunciated by the Court of International Trade, but
demonstrates that Congress intended the ITC to undertake substantial
fact-finding procedures during the preliminary determination stage. If
the ITC adhered to the decision in Republic Steel and its progeny, then
the ITC could not possibly conduct a thorough investigation only by
considering evidence that tended to support the petitioner. In addition,
the ITC has an affirmative responsibility to acquire information from
whatever sources are available. 146
The most significant effect of the American Lamb decision for for-
eign exporters, especially smaller ones, will be the elimination of unnec-
essary and costly investigations, which lead to impediments in trade and
unwarranted impositions of provisional remedies.147 Defending an-
tidumping and countervailing duty investigations can become expensive
and involve time-consuming activities unrelated to fair trade, and create
burdens on the administrative procedure. As a consequence, many
smaller exporters cannot afford to embroil themselves in lengthy pro-
ceedings.148 One of the reasons the Senate reduced the time limitation
for preliminary determinations to forty-five days was due to the finding
that lengthy investigations do not necessarily produce more accurate re-
sults. 14 9 In addition, some United States corporations have been accused
of filing antidumping or countervailing duty petitions without any sup-
port for their contentions whenever they feel threatened by a foreign
manufacturer. 150 The American Lamb decision will reduce the incentive
for this kind of activity since the respondent can quickly present evidence
to prove that no injury to an United States industry has resulted, and
thereby effectively end any further proceedings.
144 Id. 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS at 435.
145 See id.
146 See 507 F. Supp. at 1003-04.
147 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws, 7186.
148 See Legal Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at 4-5, col. 1.
149 See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 143, at 49.
150 See Legal Times, supra note 148; R. DALE, supra note 1, at 71.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit correctly premised its
decision on four major factors: 1) the plain meaning of the antidumping
and countervailing duty statutes, 2) Congress' directive that the ITC con-
duct its preliminary investigation as thoroughly as possible and with the
best information available, 3) Congress' underlying intent to provide a
forum for opposing parties to present their views, and 4) rejection of the
mere possibility standard advocated in Republic Steel. In addition, by
granting substantial deference to the ITC, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has followed the Congressional aim of ensuring that the
ITC conduct an effective and efficient preliminary determination. As a
result of the American Lamb decision, the ITC can take into account
evidence which firmly and conclusively rejects allegations in an an-
tidumping or countervailing duty petition.
If the Court of Appeals had not overturned the Court of Interna-
tional Trade's interpretation of the reasonable indication standard in
American Lamb, then United States foreign trade would have potentially
suffered serious setbacks. According to the Court of International Trade,
the slightest possibility of injury to an United States industry would have
forced the imposition of temporary relief measures. This would occur
even before actual injury from alleged dumped or subsidized imports was
fairly demonstrated. If United States trading partners had retaliated and
imposed similar procedures, then this would have impaired international
trade substantially.
Congress has correctly committed itself to protect United States in-
dustries against unfair trading practices. However, in attaining this goal,
Congress has been mindful of not only respecting United States obliga-
tions with its international trading partners, but also of promoting a sys-
tem of free world trade. Whether or not the United States can attain
these two divergent goals will depend on future policies and reactions,
but at least the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision in
American Lamb has provided a step towards those goals, rather than
impeding that progress.
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